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ABSTRACT 
This paper is divided into two parts. The first part examines the trend of IPO's 
premiums and accuracy of profits forecasting in short run and long run. The 
second part examines the reputation of underwriters and size of auditors as 
possible determination of IPO's premium and accuracy of profits forecasting. Two 
hundred and forty-five new issues were analysed for the period 1993-1996. There 
are significant excess returns on the first day of trading with an average premium 
of 88 per cent. 
The first day !PO's premiums have a significant effect of two difference economy 
period. The average first day premium is about 104 per cent in the economy boom 
period (93-94) compared to 66 per cent in the post boom period. The results on 
profit forecast error showed reasonable accuracy of forecasts with an error of 
-2.72 per cent. 
Looking at the reputation of underwriters, size of auditors and the first day IPO's 
premium. The size of auditors and reputation of underwriters are not the 
detenninates of the first day IPO's premium. From a sample of 137 companies 
after screening for outliers, 62 companies under-estimated and 75 over-estimated 
their profit forecasting. There is no statistically significant relationship between 
reputation of underwriter and size of auditor with the accuracy of profit forecasts. 
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ABSTRAK 
Kajian ini dibahagikan kepada dua babagian. Bahagian pertama menganalisa 
tentang arab aliran pulangan saham baru dan ketepatan ramalan keuntungan 
dalam prospectus bagi jangkamasa pendek and jangkamasa penjang. Bahagian 
kedua menganalisa tentang kesan kemusyhuran penaja jamin dan saiz juruaudit 
terhadap pulangan saham baru dan ketepatan ramalan keuntungan mereka. Dalam 
kajian ini, dua ratus empat puluh lima saham barn telah dipilih dan melingkungi 
tempoh masa dari tabun 1993 hingga 1996. Keputusan kajian ini menunjukkan 
bahawa terdapat pulangan positif yang singfikan sebanyak 88 peratus. 
Pulangan saham bam pada hari yang pertama, mempunyai signifikan terhadap 
perbeza keadaan ekonomi. Dalam masa ekonomi berkembang (93-94) pulangan 
saham pada hari yang pertama secara purata mencatat rekod 104 peratus, 
manakala dalam masa selepas ekonomi berkembang (95-96) purata pulangan 
saham hanya mencatat 66 peratus. Selain daripada ini, keputusan kajian tentang 
ralat ramalan keuntungan adalah dalam lingkungan ralat ramalan yang 
memuaskan iaitu -2.72 peratus. 
Kajian tentang kesan kemusyhuran penaja jamin dan saiz juruaudit terhadap 
pulangan saham baru pada hari pertama tidak dapat dibuktikan. Selepas tolak: 
saham barn yang kesilapan terlalu besar hanya tinggal 137 syarikat. 62 syarikat 
kurang ramal keuntungan mereka manakala 75 syarikat lebih ramal keuntungan 
mereka. Tidak ada signifikan hubungan diantara kemusyhuran penaja jamin dan 
saiz juruaudit terhadap ketetapan ramalan keuntungan. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The Malaysian Stock Market is relatively new. In recent years a lot of 
companies are raising funds from the public through new issues of shares. 
When firms need to raise capitals they may choose to sell or float securities. 
These new issues of shares are usually offered to the public by investment 
bankers in the primary market. Whereas, purchase and sale of already issued 
securities among investors occur in the secondary market. A company "going 
public" must provide a prospectus that includes a description of its present and 
future operations and audited financial statements. Since firms face limited 
disclosure requirements, the market usually has less public available 
information. This difference in regulatory environment provides a potentially 
fruitful setting in which to consider the effective role of the public accountant 
in ascertaining valid information for potential investors. 
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), is shares issued by privately owned company 
that is going public, that is, selling shares to the public for the first time. 
Sometimes, this is referred to as unseasoned offerings. Malaysian laws 
recognise sale of expended authorised shares of a firm as new issues. Offer of 
existing share holdings are defined as simply sales of shares. Private 
placements of shares refer to an issue that is usually sold to one or few 
institutional investors, are permitted only in limited cases. They account for 
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about 5-10 percent of the funds raised in stock exchange. Seasoned new issues 
are offered by companies, which already floated its equity in the capital 
market. 
The application of new issues in Malaysia must be opened to the public and 
allocation in event of over subscription is done by lottery. Furthermore, at 
least 30 percent of the issued shares must be set aside strictly for designated 
investment funds, individuals, companies, co-operatives, societies, institutions 
and members of certain segments of the population, who are considered to 
have less equitable capital ownership in Malaysia's stock of private capital. 
This scenario is a unique microstructure imposed by the government since 
1976 to achieve public policy's objective approved by the country's legislature 
for that purpose. 
If the company wants to be listed on KLSE, it must submit its application to 
Securities Commission (SC). The Securities Industry Act also requires 
submission of Memorandum and Articles of Association for KLSE's approval. 
The process takes about half a year. However the process in developed market 
only need 6-8 weeks. The IPOs in an emerging market are more risky. Hence, 
there will be higher risk of price changes during the long period of process. 
The situation makes the study of IPOs in KLSE more interesting. 
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Upon approval from the SC and KLSE, the company registers its prospectus 
with the Registrar of Companies (ROC). It then advertises and issues its 
prospectus to the public and the offer period opens. The company then 
announces the basis for allotment and issues shares pursuant to the allotment. 
Shares are then admitted to the official listing. The practices of building-books 
or red-herring (preliminary prospectus), which are intended to reduce 
uncertainty of off-takes of a new issue before the approval are not allowed in 
KLSE. Thus, there is high risk of price changes during the period waiting for 
the approval. 
In Malaysia, self-listing is not permitted. Firm going for listing will appoint 
investment bankers to make application and market their securities. The 
investment bankers will advise the firm regarding the terms on which it should 
attempt to sell the securities because they are more informed about the 
market's conditions. The investment bankers sometime also become 
underwriters of the firm. The condition of underwriting is between the finn 
and investment bankers. In return, the underwriters will receive underwriting 
commission from the issuer. Beside that the underwriters also become 
marketing people for their firms. 
Every time there is new issue in Malaysia, there seems to be overwhelming 
support from the pUblic. Firms normally issue new shares as the first step to be 
listed on the stock exchanges as well as souring their capital need. From the 
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investor's prospective of view, they buy new issues because they believe that 
the new issues are under-priced (Rock, 1986). This means that the public 
perceives the purchase to be short-term investment which guarantees big 
profits with minimum risk (Tinic, 1988). With this kind of belief, it is not 
surprising that every time there is a new issue, the shares are over subscribed. 
1.1 Statement of Problems 
Many findings have shown that there is excessive under-pricing ofIPO's 
in KLSE. This mean that investors who are fortunate to get IPO offer 
will get high premium on the first day of trading. However, in today's 
economic scenario performance of lPO's on the KLSE not necessarily 
generates positive premium but might even be negative premium. The 
prospectuses become a very important source to help investor understand 
the activity of the company and minimise the risk of investment. 
Disclosure of corporate profit forecasts information in the prospectuses 
for new issues is a mandatory requirement of the Company's law. 
Prospectus is the only public source of information for Fund Managers, 
corporate investors and individual investors. 
The degree of the accuracy of forecasts profits disclosed in the 
prospectus is a vital piece of information. According to SC unwritten 
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ruling since July 1987, forecast profits must not deviate more that 10% 
from actual profits. 
1. 2 Statement of Objectives 
The uncertainty of investors regarding IPO value is the basis of the 
study. Below are the issues that will be addressed in this study: 
1. To examine the trend of IPO premium in the short term and long 
term. 
2. To investigate the reliability of net profit forecasts in prospectuses. 
3. The relationship between reputation of auditor, underwriter and the 
first day Initial Public Offering premium. 
4. The relationship between forecasting error and reputation of auditor 
and underwriter. 
1 .3 Usefulness of this Study 
This research will help to substantiate further the trend of lPO premium, 
reliability of net profit forecasts in prospectuses, relationship between 
the lPO, profit forecasting errors, underwriter and auditor of emerging 
market. Apart from being useful for academic purposes, it enhances the 
investors' understanding of Malaysian Stock Market behaviour especially 
with regard to Initial Public Offerings. The investor's can use the 
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funding to create opportunities and to detect threats in their bid to make 
profit from Initial Public Offering. These findings will also help 
corporate investors to know better the behaviour of Initial Public 
Offering in KLSE. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIE W 
2.1 Evidence on IPO Performance 
A lot of international evidence on IPOs found that those experience 
strong under-pricing in the short-run but for the long run the findings are 
inconclusive. Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), Ibbotson (1975), Ibbotson 
Sindelar and Ritter (1988), Downes and Heinkel (1982), Rock 
(1986),Tinic (1988), Ritter (1991) and Welch (1989). Some research on 
the issue of securities of newly listing companies is also documented in 
Dev and Webb (1972), Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) IPOs by 
David and Michael Ryngaert (1997), and on take overs (Dave 1972), 
Westwick (1972). David and Michael Ryngaerts (1997) test on Real 
Estate Investment Trust (REIT) IPOs in 1970, 1980 and 1990 found in 
1970 and 1980's IPOs were overpriced but subsequently 
underperfonned. However 1990, findings show an average of 3.6% 
under-pricing and have moderately outperformed seasoned equity REITs 
after issuance. 
Jay R. Ritter (1991), suggested that under-pricing of initial public 
offering appears to be a short run phenomenon, and there is substantial 
variation in the under performance year to year and across industries, 
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with companies that went public in high-volume years faring the worst. 
The patterns are consistent with an IPO market in which (1) investors are 
periodically over optimistic about the earnings potential of young growth 
companies, and (2) firms take advantage of these "windows of 
opportunity". This study will analyse the IPO performance in the pre and 
post economic boom periods. 
Malaysia, Annuar, Shamsher and Ariff (1993) documented short run and 
long run under-pricing ofIPO's on the KLSE . 
Companies that were listed as new issues on KLSE raided a total of 
about RMIO billion; which is equal to 20% of the Malaysian Gross 
National Saving in 1992. In Malaysia, all new issues achieve positive 
rates of return and never yield negative return to the offer price over any 
period. This is evidenced by a record of 56 new issues in 1993. 
Investors and speculators then believed that new issues generate 
lucrative and assured returns and investing / speculating in new issues 
then become a prudent investment behaviour. This perception also 
reinforced by report fmding that Malaysia's new issues are under price 
by 7.5 times the average normal returns in the stock market. Therefore 
studies had been done to the perception of excessive under-pricing. 
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In Shamsher, Annuar and Ariff (1996) study, analysis of under-pricing of 
65 new issues over 10 years to 1993 was carried out to study the gains to 
short term speculators and long term investors. The results suggested 
that the average excess return on the first trading day is no doubt 
lucrative at 153% which is the largest reported for any country. The rate 
of return for investors holding new issues over 3 years was only 21 % per 
annum which means that in long run Malaysian IPO does generate 
excessive return. This short term large under-pricing gain is driven 
mostly by short-run price pressure. Lastly, this study suggested that 
increased allocation ratio to a higher rate of application lots could 
improve the profitability for long term investors. Ritter (1987), 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Rock (1986) suggested that this 
under-pricing was because of price being discounted to reflect the 
fundamental risk of the finn or characteristics of the pre-offering 
process. 
2.2 Reputation of Auditor and Pricing of Initial Public Offerings 
Beatty, (1986) repeats that an inverse relation exists between the 
reputation of the auditor of an initial public offering and the initial return 
earned by an investor. More reputable CPA finn exhibit less under­
pricing of an initial public offering of equity securities than clients that 
choose to hire CPA firm with less reputation capital at stake. This study 
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will also address the issue as in Malaysia, we have the reputation auditor 
such as big six and non-big six-auditor firms that vet through the listing 
finn's prospectors. 
2.3 Investment Banking, Reputation and the Under- pricing of Initial 
Public Offerings 
Ibbotson (1975) and Ritter (1984), developed and tested these two 
propositions. They demonstrate that there is a monotone relation 
between the (expected ) under-pricing of an initial public offering and 
the uncertainty of investors regarding its value. They also argue that the 
under-pricing is enforced by investment bankers, who have reputation 
capital at stake. An investment banker who 'cheats" on this under­
pricing equilibrium will lose either potential investors (if it does not 
under-price enough or issuers if it underprices too much). The evidence 
supports their propositions. Ruud (1993) argues that premium of IPO is 
due to underwriter price support. This is because the Securities and 
Exchange Commission allows investment bankers to do price 
stabilization to avoid negative returns. Richard, Frederick and Ajai 
(1997), found that the (under performance of IPO stock relative to the 
market over a three-year holding period) more reputable underwriters 
the less short-run under-pricing. 
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